Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1 e2b1979e38 Judge every route a peer announces: import policy, prefix limit, hold-down
A configured peer could announce any prefix with any path, in any
number, and all of it was stored and could be chosen as best. Each
peer now has an import policy, and every route goes through it before
it reaches the routing table.

Checks that hold for any peer unless turned off for it:
- no prefixes that are not routed on the Internet (private, loopback,
  link-local, documentation, multicast, reserved; for IPv6, anything
  outside global unicast);
- nothing longer than /24 or /48, no default route, nothing shorter
  than /8 or /16;
- no reserved, private or documentation AS number in the path;
- a path that begins with the peer's own AS (turned off for a route
  server), and of at most 64 AS numbers.

Always: a route with our own AS number in its path is refused. RFC 4271
requires this loop check and it was missing.

Per peer, if configured: the prefixes it may announce, each with an
optional longest more-specific, and the AS numbers its routes may
originate from. This is the list generated from the routing registries.

max_prefixes limits how many routes a peer may have. One more ends the
session with Cease / Maximum Number of Prefixes Reached, and the peer
is kept down for hold_down_seconds (ten minutes unless set): its
connections are not taken and it is not dialled. Refused routes do not
count towards the limit.

A refused route is withdrawn rather than ignored, so that it replaces
whatever the peer had announced for it before.

On a session with two-octet AS numbers the path is judged with its
AS4_PATH merged in, so that the real AS numbers are what is checked.

Peers that are not configured (accept_unconfigured_peers, for test
networks) get a policy that takes everything but loops.

Refusals are counted in bgp_routes_rejected_total by reason. The status
page and /api/peers show, for each session, how many routes the peer
has and how many were refused. The server warns at startup about peers
with no limit.

The prefix check costs about 4 ns a route with the default policy; the
end-to-end benchmark is unchanged.

Also: the benchmark's server AS is one that is in none of its generated
paths, and a table test that depended on the hasher's seed is fixed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:59:37 +02:00

BGP

The bgp crate is an implementation of the Border Gateway Protocol, which is used to exchange routing and control plane information between Autonomous Systems.

The aim of this project is to provide a modern, high performance, secure, programmatic and customizable software package that can be useful to network operators, researchers, and people interested in Internet.

Current status.

The project is currently being rewritten from scratch to be more modular and maintainable, as well as to fix deeper issues with the previous implementation.

⚠️ Warning: This is currently a work in progress and not ready for use.

🛣️ Roadmap to v1.0

We aim for the 1.0 release to be functional and stable to operate peering sessions, and to install routes in the Linux Kernel.

  • ☐ Implement basic parsers for the fundamental types required
    • ✅ Path Attributes from RFC4271
    • ✅ Open message
      • ✅ Capabilities from RFC4271
    • ✅ Update message
    • ☐ Notification message
  • ✅ Implement scaffolding required to start and configure a server
  • ✅ Implement connection logic to establish sessions with peers (passive and active)
  • ✅ Routes originated from the configuration, with communities, announced to all peers
  • ✅ Read-only HTTP API, status page and Prometheus metrics
  • ☐ Implement an efficient data structure for storing prefixes (e.g. Poptrie)
  • ☐ Filtering for peer RIB in / out
  • ☐ Main / auxiliary RIBs for exchanging routes between peers

Development

CI runs these three on every push, and fails on any warning:

cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --workspace

Lints are configured once, under [workspace.lints] in the root Cargo.toml. unsafe code is forbidden throughout.

cargo test includes property tests: generated messages must survive being written and read back, and no input, however damaged, may make a parser panic. They take about a second; for a longer hunt:

PROPTEST_CASES=1000000 cargo test --release -p bgp-packet --test properties

Coverage-guided fuzz targets for the same parsers are in fuzz/; see fuzz/README.md. CI runs each of them for a minute.

License

Apache License 2.0; see LICENSE.

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