Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1 9ca86ede2f Harden import, the kernel task and the RTR client after review
Three independent reviews (hijack resistance, reliability, code health)
of the whole tree. This is what they found that could let a bad route in
or take the daemon down.

Hijacks:
- A route had two paths on a two-octet session, AS_PATH and AS4_PATH,
  read in two places by two rules. A peer could make the origin checked
  on import differ from the one checked at revalidation, and get an
  RPKI-invalid route into the table. AS4_PATH is now merged into AS_PATH
  once, on receipt (RFC 6793 §4.2.3), and nothing else knows of it.
- The next hop is judged on import: it must be usable, agreed on
  (RFC 8950), and by default the peer itself.
- Our own originated prefixes are not taken from other networks.
- A route for a network the machine is on is never put in the kernel.
- Paths with an AS_SET are refused (RFC 9774).
- A configured peer gets one session, not one per BGP Identifier.
- More IPv6 special-purpose prefixes are bogons.

Reliability:
- A batch of requests the kernel refused could overflow the netlink
  socket and end the daemon. The socket has room now, a lost answer or a
  silent kernel means asking what is there, and neither is fatal.
- Working the routes out again within the grace period after a restart
  no longer drops the routes being kept.
- That work can no longer be put off for ever by interface changes.
- Peers whose sessions keep failing are slowed down.
- Unused attribute sets are swept when they pile up, not only each
  minute.
- Log lines a peer can cause are said once in a while.
- An RTR answer is bounded in size and time; data cannot expire between
  two refreshes.
- The shard of a key is taken from a stirred hash: neighbouring bits of
  the hash proved alike for prefixes in a row. The test that showed it,
  failing one run in sixteen, is deterministic now.

The lab has a phase, hijacks, in which FRR tries the first three.
route::apply is a struct with methods instead of nested closures, and
the kernel task's loop is shorter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 19:13:40 +02:00

BGP

The bgp crate is an implementation of the Border Gateway Protocol, which is used to exchange routing and control plane information between Autonomous Systems.

The aim of this project is to provide a modern, high performance, secure, programmatic and customizable software package that can be useful to network operators, researchers, and people interested in Internet.

Current status.

The project is currently being rewritten from scratch to be more modular and maintainable, as well as to fix deeper issues with the previous implementation.

⚠️ Warning: This is currently a work in progress and not ready for use.

🛣️ Roadmap to v1.0

We aim for the 1.0 release to be functional and stable to operate peering sessions, and to install routes in the Linux Kernel.

  • ☐ Implement basic parsers for the fundamental types required
    • ✅ Path Attributes from RFC4271
    • ✅ Open message
      • ✅ Capabilities from RFC4271
    • ✅ Update message
    • ☐ Notification message
  • ✅ Implement scaffolding required to start and configure a server
  • ✅ Implement connection logic to establish sessions with peers (passive and active)
  • ✅ Routes originated from the configuration, with communities, announced to all peers
  • ✅ Read-only HTTP API, status page and Prometheus metrics
  • ☐ Implement an efficient data structure for storing prefixes (e.g. Poptrie)
  • ☐ Filtering for peer RIB in / out
  • ☐ Main / auxiliary RIBs for exchanging routes between peers

Development

CI runs these three on every push, and fails on any warning:

cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --workspace

Lints are configured once, under [workspace.lints] in the root Cargo.toml. unsafe code is forbidden throughout.

cargo test includes property tests: generated messages must survive being written and read back, and no input, however damaged, may make a parser panic. They take about a second; for a longer hunt:

PROPTEST_CASES=1000000 cargo test --release -p bgp-packet --test properties

Coverage-guided fuzz targets for the same parsers are in fuzz/; see fuzz/README.md. CI runs each of them for a minute.

License

Apache License 2.0; see LICENSE.

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