Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1 9ca86ede2f Harden import, the kernel task and the RTR client after review
Three independent reviews (hijack resistance, reliability, code health)
of the whole tree. This is what they found that could let a bad route in
or take the daemon down.

Hijacks:
- A route had two paths on a two-octet session, AS_PATH and AS4_PATH,
  read in two places by two rules. A peer could make the origin checked
  on import differ from the one checked at revalidation, and get an
  RPKI-invalid route into the table. AS4_PATH is now merged into AS_PATH
  once, on receipt (RFC 6793 §4.2.3), and nothing else knows of it.
- The next hop is judged on import: it must be usable, agreed on
  (RFC 8950), and by default the peer itself.
- Our own originated prefixes are not taken from other networks.
- A route for a network the machine is on is never put in the kernel.
- Paths with an AS_SET are refused (RFC 9774).
- A configured peer gets one session, not one per BGP Identifier.
- More IPv6 special-purpose prefixes are bogons.

Reliability:
- A batch of requests the kernel refused could overflow the netlink
  socket and end the daemon. The socket has room now, a lost answer or a
  silent kernel means asking what is there, and neither is fatal.
- Working the routes out again within the grace period after a restart
  no longer drops the routes being kept.
- That work can no longer be put off for ever by interface changes.
- Peers whose sessions keep failing are slowed down.
- Unused attribute sets are swept when they pile up, not only each
  minute.
- Log lines a peer can cause are said once in a while.
- An RTR answer is bounded in size and time; data cannot expire between
  two refreshes.
- The shard of a key is taken from a stirred hash: neighbouring bits of
  the hash proved alike for prefixes in a row. The test that showed it,
  failing one run in sixteen, is deterministic now.

The lab has a phase, hijacks, in which FRR tries the first three.
route::apply is a struct with methods instead of nested closures, and
the kernel task's loop is shorter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 19:13:40 +02:00
Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1 bdaf226a16 Validate route origins against the RPKI and refuse invalid routes
With rpki { caches { ... } } in the configuration the server keeps the
validated ROA payloads of a validator and validates every route from a
peer outside its own AS (RFC 6811). An invalid route is refused, unless
its peer has accept_rpki_invalid. Valid and not-found routes are taken;
validity does not otherwise enter route selection.

Validity is not settled when a route arrives: the data changes every few
minutes. The routes follow, without the peer sending anything again.

- A route refused as invalid is held by its session, out of the table.
  When the data changes the session looks at what it holds, and what is
  no longer invalid goes into the table. A held route is the peer's to
  withdraw or replace like any other.
- A route in the table that becomes invalid is found by a task that
  looks through the table when the data changes, at the prefixes the
  changed VRPs cover, and is taken out and held by its session.
- If the data expires because no cache confirms it, nothing is invalid
  any more and everything held is taken.
- A session holds at most 200,000 routes; past that it asks the peer for
  a route refresh when the data changes.

So that the table can be looked through without parsing attributes, an
attribute set's key now has the route's origin AS. Memory per route is
unchanged at 52 bytes on the real table.

Shown: /api/rpki and a section of the status page with the cache, its
state and the age of the data; each route's validity; each peer's count
of held routes. Refusals are recorded under "RPKI invalid". Metrics:
bgp_rpki_vrps and bgp_rpki_updates_total.

Also: Negotiated says whether the peer supports route refresh, and
docs/RFCs.md is brought up to date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 13:39:40 +02:00
Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Sonnet 4.6 1ec60255ea feature: BGP server, FSM, Adj-RIB-In actor, and integration tests
- Implement passive-side BGP FSM (OpenSent → OpenConfirm → Established)
  with hold timer, keepalive timer, and NOTIFICATION on expiry
- Add bgp-server crate: config validation, TCP listener accept loop
  (BgpServerBuilder → BgpServer), connection dispatch
- Add bgp-rib crate: Adj-RIB-In actor owning route state with event
  broadcast for streaming consumers and snapshot for introspection
- Wire Adj-RIB-In into FSM: announce/withdraw on UPDATE for both legacy
  IPv4 NLRI fields and MP_REACH/MP_UNREACH path attributes
- Add bgp-integration-tests crate with 15 end-to-end tests covering
  session establishment, timers, UPDATE handling, and RIB introspection
- Fix require_empty! macro bug in open.rs (checked wrong buffer)
- Fix FourByteAsn capability parser returning consumed buffer as remainder
- Fix tracing subscriber not being installed in TracingArgs::install
- Expand docs/RFCs.md with full implementation status across 15 RFCs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 00:21:51 +02:00