Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1
3d946c32ce
What the code-health review found, and what a fuzz target written for it
found in its first seconds.
- A set of attributes with the same attribute twice is refused by the
routing table. Its readers (the selection key, the path, the next hop)
could each take a different one of the two. The decoder never lets one
through; the new fuzz target `attrs` found that the table would.
- bgp_peer_up{peer}, to alert on a peer going away, and bgp_build_info.
Every metric is there from the first scrape. Alerts for a peer down,
hijack attempts and kernel errors are in the README.
- `bgp --check config` validates a configuration without starting, and
`--version` says which build it is. CI runs the first on the example
configuration, which a test now also parses with its commented fields
put in; the example had to learn about the next hop check.
- Path attributes have a module of their own, packet::attributes,
re-exported from packet::message as before.
- policy::From, which shadowed the trait, is RouteSource. The server's
connection, dialer and fsm modules are private. Logging arguments live
in the binary; the server library no longer depends on clap.
- One is_unicast_link_local (the standard library's) instead of two of
our own; SelectionKey::origin(); one place where an Import is made.
- READMEs say what the daemon does today rather than what it did not do
a year ago. Documentation links are checked in CI. Unused dependencies
and bgp_web::serve are gone; the Docker build is --locked and does not
ship the fuzz corpus.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
81 lines
3.5 KiB
Protocol Buffer Text Format
81 lines
3.5 KiB
Protocol Buffer Text Format
# A worked example; the fields are documented in
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# crates/server/proto/config.proto.
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router_id: "10.0.0.1"
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local_asn: 65000
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# Where to accept BGP connections. Port 179 needs privileges; pick another
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# port to run unprivileged against a peer that dials a custom port.
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listen_endpoints { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 179 }
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listen_endpoints { address: "::1" port: 179 }
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# A peer we connect to and accept connections from. Connections from any
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# other address are closed unread, unless accept_unconfigured_peers is set,
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# which is for a closed test network only.
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peers {
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name: "r1"
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endpoint { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 1791 }
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remote_asn: 65001
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hold_time_seconds: 30
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# Offer only these families to the peer. Left out, all are offered.
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address_families: IPV4_UNICAST
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address_families: IPV6_UNICAST
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# Take several routes for a prefix from this peer, if it offers to send
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# them (ADD-PATH). Also ADD_PATH_SEND and ADD_PATH_BOTH. Off by default.
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add_path: ADD_PATH_RECEIVE
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# What the peer is to us: PROVIDER, CUSTOMER, PEER, ROUTE_SERVER or
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# ROUTE_SERVER_CLIENT. With it the peer must not claim to be something
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# else (RFC 9234), routes are marked "only to customer" and leaks of
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# marked routes are refused; and with a validator that has ASPAs, the
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# AS paths of the peer's routes are verified.
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# role: PEER
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# Refuse the peer if its OPEN does not say what it is.
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# require_role: true
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# Which of the peer's routes are taken. Without this block the general
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# checks still apply: no private or reserved prefixes or AS numbers,
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# nothing longer than /24 or /48, no default route, and a path that
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# begins with the peer's AS. This example is a test network that uses
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# exactly such prefixes and AS numbers, so it takes them.
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import {
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# More routes than this ends the session and keeps the peer down
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# for hold_down_seconds (600 unless set).
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max_prefixes: 1000
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accept_bogons: true
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# A route's next hop has to be the peer itself. The test peer of
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# this example is at 127.0.0.1, which nothing can be sent by way
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# of, and names another address; so here any is taken.
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accept_third_party_next_hop: true
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# For a real peer: the prefixes and origin ASes it may announce,
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# as generated from the routing registries.
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# prefixes { prefix: "193.0.0.0/21" max_length: 24 }
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# origin_asns: 3333
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}
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}
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connect_retry_seconds: 5
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# Let a restarted peer replace a stale Established session immediately
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# (RFC 4271 CollisionDetectEstablishedState). Default false.
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collision_detect_established_state: false
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# Routes this router originates, announced to every peer.
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originate { prefix: "10.100.0.0/16" }
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originate {
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prefix: "2001:db8:100::/48"
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med: 50
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communities: "65000:100"
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large_communities: "65000:1:2"
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}
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# Validation with the RPKI: refuse routes whose origin AS is not the one the
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# holder of the addresses authorised, and, from peers with a role, routes
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# whose AS path is a leak. Point it at a validator's RTR server.
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# rpki { caches { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 3323 } }
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# Put the best route of every prefix in the kernel's routing table, so that
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# this machine forwards by them (Linux; needs CAP_NET_ADMIN). Routes are
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# marked "proto bgp"; table and metric default to 254 (main) and 20.
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# kernel {}
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# Read-only status page, JSON API and metrics. It has no authentication:
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# keep it on loopback or behind a reverse proxy.
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http_endpoint { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 8080 }
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