Files
ferrix/bin/bgp
Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1 16a4e3b640 Typed errors in the library crates; send the NOTIFICATION RFC 4271 assigns
The library crates returned eyre reports, so a failure was a string and the
session code could not tell a truncated UPDATE from a bad header. Whatever
went wrong, the peer got an FSM error or nothing.

Each crate now has its own error types:

- bgp-primitives: PrefixError, UnknownAfi and UnknownSafi, and EncodeError
  for every to_wire.
- bgp-packet: Message::decode returns a DecodeError naming the NOTIFICATION
  code, subcode and data for the failure (header errors per section 6.1,
  OPEN per 6.2, UPDATE per 6.3). InvalidValue and CommunityError replace
  the remaining strings. from_wire is now a thin wrapper around decode.
- bgp-server: SessionError, ServerError and ConfigError. Every abnormal end
  of a session goes through one function that sends the NOTIFICATION the
  error maps to. The message length is checked against the 4096-octet
  maximum before the body is read.
- bgp-web: serve returns io::Error.

eyre remains in the binary and in tests.

Bugs found and fixed on the way:

- An OPEN with no optional parameters, which is valid, failed to parse.
- An unsupported BGP version was reported as an unknown optional parameter.
  It now gets Unsupported Version Number with the version we speak as data.
- A SAFI above 255 was truncated to its low octet and could match a known
  one.
- Prefix text with a length beyond the address size (10.0.0.0/99) was
  accepted.
- Message::to_wire truncated the body length to 16 bits before checking it.
- A peer hold time above 65535 seconds in the configuration wrapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 21:18:35 +02:00
..

BGP

This crate provides the bgp binary, which runs the Border Gateway Protocol daemon together with its read-only HTTP status interface.

cargo run -- path/to/config.textpb

The configuration format is defined in crates/server/proto/config.proto; testdata/server.textpb is a worked example. The daemon is configured entirely through that file: peers, and the routes it originates (originate { prefix: ... }). There is no way to change either at runtime.

When http_endpoint is set the binary also serves:

Path Purpose
GET /statusz Status page: configuration, peers and session state, originated and received routes, live event log
GET /api/status Router ID, ASN, uptime and table sizes
GET /api/config The configuration file as read at startup
GET /api/peers Configured peers and established sessions
GET /api/routes/local Originated routes
GET /api/routes/received Adj-RIB-In contents
GET /api/events Server-sent events for session and route changes
GET /metricz Prometheus metrics

Everything under it is read-only and unauthenticated. Bind it to loopback or put it behind a reverse proxy.

What it does today

It establishes sessions (both dialling configured peers and accepting connections, with RFC 4271 collision detection), announces its originated routes to every peer with itself as next hop, and records what peers send in an Adj-RIB-In. It does not select best paths, re-advertise received routes or program a forwarding table, and it has no import or export policy.

Trying it without a router

fake_peer is a minimal BGP speaker that connects to the daemon, announces a prefix, prints every UPDATE it receives and, with --echo, re-announces each received prefix back with its own ASN prepended (dropping NO_EXPORT routes). That makes originated prefixes show up in the received table as if they had travelled through a neighbouring AS:

cargo run -- testdata/server.textpb
cargo run -p bgp-integration-tests --example fake_peer -- \
    --server 127.0.0.1:179 --asn 65001 --announce 203.0.113.0/24 --echo

Please refer to the other implementation crates in this repository where most of the actual implementation lives.

Warning: This is still very much a work in progress and is not yet ready for production use.