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ferrix/testdata/server.textpb
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Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1 f9ef781d51 Check roles in OPEN and prevent route leaks with Only to Customer (RFC 9234)
A peer's configured role now does three more things:

- Our OPEN carries the BGP Role capability with what we are to the peer.
  A peer whose own says it is something that does not pair with that, or
  that sends two different roles, is refused with OPEN Message Error /
  Role Mismatch. A peer that says nothing is accepted unless require_role
  is set. A role on a peer in our own AS is a configuration error.
- Routes from a provider, a peer or a route server are marked Only to
  Customer on the way in if they are not already, and our routes are
  marked on the way out to a customer, a peer or a route server client.
- A marked route from a customer or route server client, or from a peer
  with someone else's mark, is a leak and is refused. No policy setting
  turns that off.

The packet crate gains the Only to Customer attribute (malformed:
treat-as-withdraw), and the Role Mismatch subcode is corrected from 8 to
11.

The status page shows whether the peer confirmed its role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 14:27:36 +02:00

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# A worked example; the fields are documented in
# crates/server/proto/config.proto.
router_id: "10.0.0.1"
local_asn: 65000
# Where to accept BGP connections. Port 179 needs privileges; pick another
# port to run unprivileged against a peer that dials a custom port.
listen_endpoints { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 179 }
listen_endpoints { address: "::1" port: 179 }
# A peer we connect to and accept connections from. Connections from any
# other address are closed unread, unless accept_unconfigured_peers is set,
# which is for a closed test network only.
peers {
name: "r1"
endpoint { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 1791 }
remote_asn: 65001
hold_time_seconds: 30
# Offer only these families to the peer. Left out, all are offered.
address_families: IPV4_UNICAST
address_families: IPV6_UNICAST
# Take several routes for a prefix from this peer, if it offers to send
# them (ADD-PATH). Also ADD_PATH_SEND and ADD_PATH_BOTH. Off by default.
add_path: ADD_PATH_RECEIVE
# What the peer is to us: PROVIDER, CUSTOMER, PEER, ROUTE_SERVER or
# ROUTE_SERVER_CLIENT. With it the peer must not claim to be something
# else (RFC 9234), routes are marked "only to customer" and leaks of
# marked routes are refused; and with a validator that has ASPAs, the
# AS paths of the peer's routes are verified.
# role: PEER
# Refuse the peer if its OPEN does not say what it is.
# require_role: true
# Which of the peer's routes are taken. Without this block the general
# checks still apply: no private or reserved prefixes or AS numbers,
# nothing longer than /24 or /48, no default route, and a path that
# begins with the peer's AS. This example is a test network that uses
# exactly such prefixes and AS numbers, so it takes them.
import {
# More routes than this ends the session and keeps the peer down
# for hold_down_seconds (600 unless set).
max_prefixes: 1000
accept_bogons: true
# For a real peer: the prefixes and origin ASes it may announce,
# as generated from the routing registries.
# prefixes { prefix: "193.0.0.0/21" max_length: 24 }
# origin_asns: 3333
}
}
connect_retry_seconds: 5
# Let a restarted peer replace a stale Established session immediately
# (RFC 4271 CollisionDetectEstablishedState). Default false.
collision_detect_established_state: false
# Routes this router originates, announced to every peer.
originate { prefix: "10.100.0.0/16" }
originate {
prefix: "2001:db8:100::/48"
med: 50
communities: "65000:100"
large_communities: "65000:1:2"
}
# Validation with the RPKI: refuse routes whose origin AS is not the one the
# holder of the addresses authorised, and, from peers with a role, routes
# whose AS path is a leak. Point it at a validator's RTR server.
# rpki { caches { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 3323 } }
# Read-only status page, JSON API and metrics. It has no authentication:
# keep it on loopback or behind a reverse proxy.
http_endpoint { address: "127.0.0.1" port: 8080 }