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ferrix/fuzz/README.md
Rayhaan JaufeerallyandClaude Fable 5.1 39632e3c38 Property tests and fuzz targets for the parsers, and the bugs they found
Property tests (run by `cargo test`):
- crates/packet/tests/properties.rs: every kind of message, generated,
  must be written, be as long as wire_len says, and read back equal; and
  noise, noise behind a valid header, and valid messages with bytes damaged
  must never do more than return an error. Anything the decoder accepts
  must be showable and survive being written and read again.
- IpPrefix: text round trip, noise as text, `contains` against a bitwise
  model.
- The session's framing: a stream of messages yields the same messages
  however it is cut into reads.

Fuzz targets (fuzz/, cargo-fuzz on nightly, a minute each in CI): raw
messages, message bodies behind a valid header, prefix text, the
configuration file.

Bugs found, each with a named regression test:
- A prefix longer than its address family (e.g. an IPv4 NLRI of length 99)
  was accepted, and showing it panicked. The session logs every route, so
  one UPDATE from a peer ended the session task. Such a prefix is now
  malformed, and showing a prefix cannot fail.
- Bits past a prefix's length were kept, so the same prefix sent with stray
  bits was a different key in the RIB. Prefixes now have one form.
- An opaque extended community was read as seven octets instead of eight,
  putting every community after it out of step.
- AGGREGATOR could be neither read from nor written to a peer with
  two-octet AS numbers.
- The Outbound Route Filter and Long-Lived Graceful Restart capabilities
  were written differently from how they are read.
- A capability value or unknown attribute too long for its length field
  was written with the length wrapped around; it is now an error, or for
  the attribute the two-octet length.

Also: ROUTE-REFRESH carries its AFI and SAFI instead of being modelled as
an empty message, and one with a body of the wrong length is refused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 22:54:37 +02:00

1.8 KiB

Fuzz targets

Coverage-guided fuzzing of everything that reads input we do not control. The property tests (cargo test, e.g. crates/packet/tests/properties.rs) check the same things on generated input and run on every build; these targets go further by letting libFuzzer follow code coverage for as long as you leave them running.

Target Input
message Raw bytes as they come off a TCP connection
message_body A message body behind a correct header (reaches the body parsers)
prefix_text A prefix as text
config The configuration file

For the two message targets a finding is either a panic, or a message the decoder accepted that cannot be written and read back as itself.

Running

libFuzzer needs a nightly toolchain and cargo-fuzz:

rustup toolchain install nightly
cargo install cargo-fuzz

Then, from this directory:

cargo +nightly fuzz run message_body corpus/message_body seeds/message_body -- -max_total_time=300

The first directory is the working corpus, which the fuzzer adds to and which is not checked in. seeds/ holds a few valid inputs to start from. Leave out -max_total_time to run until interrupted.

When it finds something

The input is saved under artifacts/<target>/. Reproduce it with

cargo +nightly fuzz run message_body artifacts/message_body/crash-...

Fix the bug, and add a unit test with the input next to the code it broke, so that cargo test keeps it fixed without anyone having to run the fuzzer.